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This paper analyzes mean reversion in international stock markets during the period 
1900-2008, using annual data. Our panel of stock indexes in seventeen developed 
countries, covering a time span of more than a century, allows us to analyze in 
detail the dynamics of the mean-reversion process. In the period 1900-2008 it takes 
stock prices about 13.8 years, on average, to absorb half of a shock. However, using 
a rolling-window approach we establish large fluctuations in the speed of mean 
reversion over time. The highest mean reversion speed is found for the period 
including the Great Depression and the start of World War II. Furthermore, the early 
years of the Cold War and the period covering the Oil Crisis of 1973, the 
Energy Crisis of 1979 and Black Monday in 1987 are also characterized by relatively 
fast mean reversion. Overall, we document half-lives ranging from a minimum of 2.1 
years to a maximum of 23.8 years. In a substantial number of time periods no 
significant mean reversion is found at all, which underlines the fact that the choice 
of data sample contributes substantially to the evidence in favor of mean reversion. 
Our results suggest that the speed at which stocks revert to their fundamental value 
is higher in periods of high economic uncertainty, caused by major economic and 
political events. 
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The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily shared by DNB 1 Introduction
In early March 2009, many stock markets across the world dropped to their lowest value since
the dot-com crisis. In less than two years, U.S. equity market indexes lost more than 50% of their
value. At the time, a discussion was going on about future stock price movements. Some argued
that when stocks are down over 50%, an increase must surely follow. And the increase followed
indeed. At the end of 2009, stock markets were up more than 30% relative to March 2009. Looking
back, it is tempting to think that the increase following the deep drop might have been expected.
The presence or absence of mean reversion has several important economic implications. Vari-
ous studies show that excess returns can be earned by exploiting the mean reversion of stock prices
(De Bondt & Thaler1985,1987,Jegadeesh & Titman1993,Campbell & Shiller2001,Balvers et al.
2000, Gropp 2004). Moreover, in a study about pension fund regulation, Vlaar (2005) argues that
mean reversion in stock prices would strongly increase the attractiveness of equity investments
for pension funds. If stock prices are mean-reverting, low returns are followed by higher expected
future returns, which could stimulate pension funds to invest in equity after a downfall of the stock
market.
Do stock prices really exhibit mean-reverting behavior in the long run? For more than two
decades the economic literature has attempted to answer this question. Although early studies doc-
ument signiﬁcant mean reversion, the general thought on the subject is that convincing evidence
has yet to emerge.
The economic literature distinguishes between so-called absolute and relative mean reversion.
With absolute mean reversion, stock prices are mean-reverting relative to an unspeciﬁed mean
value. This is equivalent to negative autocorrelation in stock returns. Speciﬁcations based on rel-
ative mean reversion generally posit a direct relation between stock prices and fundamental indi-
cators, such as dividends and earnings. Fama & French (1988b) and Poterba & Summers (1988)
were the ﬁrst to provide empirical evidence in favor of absolute mean reversion. Fama & French
(1988b) document that 25   40% of the variation in 3   5 year stock returns can be attributed to
negative serial correlation.
A major problem in analyzing mean reversion over long horizons is the limited amount of
1available data. Fama & French (1988b) and Poterba & Summers (1988) analyze the time period
from 1926 to 1985, using yearly overlapping returns (based on monthly data) to increase the num-
ber of observations. Both studies base their results on long-term returns, with investment horizons
between one and ten years. To deal with the issue of dependency, which is inherent in the use
of overlapping observations, they apply the method of Hansen & Hodrick (1980). However, this
approach suffers from substantial small-sample bias. Richardson & Smith (1991) show that the
evidence for long-term mean reversion disappears if the small-sample bias is removed. Moreover,
Fama & French (1988b) ignore the seasonal effects in stock price movements. Jegadeesh (1991)
shows that mean reversion in stock prices is entirely concentrated in January.
To circumvent the problems of overlapping samples and seasonality, Balvers et al. (2000) take
a different approach. They focus on relative instead of absolute mean reversion. According to
Balvers et al. (2000), the stationary relation between the fundamental value of a stock and a bench-
mark permits direct assessment of the speed of mean reversion. Moreover, they use annual instead
of monthly data to avoid the problem of seasonality. Furthermore, to estimate the mean-reversion
process more accurately, Balvers et al. (2000) adopt a panel data approach. Comparing the stock
indexes of eighteen OECD countries to a world index benchmark during the period 1970   1996,
they establish signiﬁcant mean reversion, with a half-life of approximately 3.5 years. The half-life
measures the period it takes for stock prices to absorb half of a shock. Balvers et al. (2000) ﬁnd a
90% conﬁdence interval for the half-life equal to .2:4;5:9/ years.
Several arguments plead against the assumption of a constant speed of mean reversion. For
example, Kim et al. (1991) conclude that mean reversion is a pre-war phenomenon only. Further-
more, Poterba & Summers (1988) conclude that the Great Depression had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the speed of mean reversion. Also the difference in the speed of mean reversion between our
long sample period and the short interval considered by Balvers et al. (2000) suggests changes in
the speed of mean-reversion over timee. Moreover, we may expect the speed of mean reversion
to depend on the economic and political environment; see e.g. Kim et al. (1991). Consequently,
the speed of mean reversion is expected to ﬂuctuate over time. However, to our knowledge all
previous studies in the ﬁeld examine mean reversion in a static framework, thereby ignoring ﬂuc-
tuations in the speed of mean reversion over time. In our study we apply the panel data approach
2of Balvers et al. (2000) to a long data sample of international stock indexes, covering the period
from 1900 to 2008. Our large sample of stock indexes in seventeen countries, covering a time span
of more than a century, allows us to analyze in detail the dynamics of the mean-reversion pro-
cess. In 1900   2008 period, it takes stock prices on average 13.8 years to absorb half of a shock.
However, using a rolling-window approach we establish large ﬂuctuations in the speed of mean
reversion over time. The highest speed of mean reversion is found for the period including the
Great Depression and the start of World War II. Similarly, the early years of the Cold War and the
period covering the Oil Crisis of 1973, the Energy Crisis of 1979 and Black Monday in 1987 also
show relatively fast mean reversion. Overall, we document half-lives ranging from a minimum of
2.1 years to a maximum of 23.8 years. In a substantial number of time intervals no signiﬁcant
mean reversion is found at all, which underlines the fact that the choice of the data sample con-
tributes substantially to the evidence in favor mean reversion. Our results suggest that stocks revert
more rapidly to their fundamental value in periods of high economic uncertainty, caused by major
economic and political events.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of twenty
years of research on the mean-reverting behavior of stock prices. The approach used in this paper
to test for mean reversion is explained in Section 3. Next, Section 4 describes the data used for
the empirical analysis of Section 5. The issue of time-varying mean reversion is addressed in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Long-term mean reversion: 20 years of history
Some studies have found evidence in favor of mean reversion, whereas others have established
strong evidence against it. Several theories have been presented to explain mean reversion in stock
prices. These explanations are strongly related to the issue of market efﬁciency. The efﬁcient mar-
ket hypothesis states that all available information is reﬂected in the value of a stock (Fama 1991).
Mean reversion in stock prices may reﬂect market inefﬁciency. According to Poterba & Summers
(1988), mean reversion may be caused by the irrational behavior of noise traders, resulting in
stock prices that take wide swings away from their fundamental value. Irrational pricing behavior,
3in turn, can be caused by fads (McQueen 1992, Summers 1986), overreaction to ﬁnancial news
(De Bondt & Thaler 1985, 1987) or investor’s opportunism (Poterba & Summers 1988). Mean re-
version in stock prices may also occur in efﬁcient markets. Assuming that all available informa-
tion is incorporated into stock prices, the value of a stock is determined by the expected returns
per share. Consequently, mean reversion is observed when expected returns are mean-reverting
(Summers 1986). Conrad & Kaul (1988) ﬁnd that the time-varying process of the expected return
is stationary, i.e. it reverts to its mean over time. Therefore, mean reversion in stock prices does
not contradict market efﬁciency (Fama & French 1988b). Fluctuations in expected returns may
be explained from uncertainty about the survival of the economy, caused by e.g. a world war or
a depression (Kim et al. 1991). Fluctuations in expected returns may also be caused by rational
speculative bubbles and uncertain company prospects can cause ﬂuctuations in expected returns
(McQueen 1992).
2.1 Absolute mean reversion
Fama & French (1988b) were the ﬁrst to document signiﬁcant evidence in favor of absolute mean
reversion at long horizons. They examine several investment horizons between one and ten years
and document signiﬁcant mean reversion, which explains 25   40% of the variation in 3   5 year
stock returns. Poterba & Summers (1988) use a speciﬁc property of the random walk to obtain
signiﬁcant evidence in favor of mean reversion. They establish long-run mean reversion in the
United States and several other developed countries. The lack of signiﬁcance in their results is
attributed to the absence of more powerful statistical tests to reject the null hypothesis.
Both Fama & French (1988b) and Poterba & Summers (1988) analyze the time period from
1926 to 1985 and work with yearly overlapping stock returns to increase the number of obser-
vations. The issue of dependency, which is inherent to the use of overlapping observations, is
solved applying the method of Hansen & Hodrick (1980). Richardson & Smith (1991) criticize
this approach and address the problem of small-sample bias. They show that the evidence sup-
porting long-term mean reversion disappears if they remove the small-sample bias. Moreover,
Richardson & Stock (1990) argue that the use of a larger overlapping interval at longer invest-
ment horizons increases the power of the statistical tests used to test the random walk hypothesis.
4Their more powerful statistical test does not result in a rejection of the random walk hypothesis.
Jegadeesh (1991) raises the issue of seasonality caused by the use use of monthly overlapping
stock returns.
Apart from the issues related to the use of use of monthly overlapping stock returns, the results
of Fama & French (1988b) are also subject to other types of criticism. McQueen (1992) addresses
the issue of heteroskedasticity in the sample period. The highly volatile years tend to have a larger
inﬂuence on the results because of their relatively heavy weights. McQueen (1992) ﬁnds that the
highly volatile periods exhibit stronger mean-reverting tendencies and that the overall evidence
of mean reversion is therefore overstated. Kim & Nelson (1998) and Kim et al. (1998) criticize
Fama & French (1988b) and Poterba & Summers (1988) on similar grounds. The issue of het-
eroskedasticity is directly linked to another point of criticism. Periods of high volatility may not
be representative of current stock price behavior. Poterba & Summers (1988) note that the Great
Depression has substantial inﬂuence on the estimates of the mean-reversion parameters. Exclud-
ing this period considerably weakens the evidence of mean reversion. Kim et al. (1991) divide the
total sample period into a period before and a period after World War II and conclude that mean
reversion is a pre-war phenomenon only. Furthermore, the post-war period reveals mean aversion,
indicating a structural break in stock price behavior.1
2.2 Relative mean reversion
The lack of evidence for mean reversion is often attributed to small sample size in combination
with statistical tests for mean reversion that lack power. A substantial improvement in estimation
accuracy maybe achieved by explicitly specifying the fundamental value process around which
stock prices are mean-reverting. An important question is how to proxy the fundamental value
process, which is inherently unobserved. According to the Gorden growth model, the value of
a stock equals the discounted future cash ﬂows generated by the stock (Gorden 1959). In prac-
tice, these cash ﬂow are the dividends that will be paid out to the owners. As an alternative to
estimating future dividends, earnings could be used as a proxy of future cash ﬂows towards in-
vestors. Other possible proxies are valuation ratios, such as dividend yield or price-earnings ra-
tios. Campbell & Shiller (2001) examine the mean-reverting behavior of the dividend yield and
5price-earnings ratio over time. Theoretically, these ratios are expected to be mean-reverting, since
fundamentals are determinants of stock prices. If stock prices are high in comparison to company
fundamentals, it is expected that an adjustment to either stock prices or fundamentals will follow.
Campbell & Shiller (2001) ﬁnd that stock prices rather than company fundamentals contribute
most to adjusting the ratios towards an equilibrium level. Coakley & Fuertes (2006) consider the
mean-reverting behavior of valuation ratios and attribute it to differences in investor sentiment.
The authors conclude that in the long run ﬁnancial ratios revert to their mean. In earlier work,
Fama & French (1988a) link the dividend yield to the expected returns of a stock and ﬁnd that
the latter have a mean-reverting tendency. A second speciﬁcation of fundamental value is based
on asset pricing models. Ho & Sears (2004) link the mean-reverting behavior of stocks to the
Fama-French three factor model and conclude that such models cannot capture the mean-reverting
behavior of stock prices. Similar conclusions emerge from Gangopadhyay & Reinganum (1996).
However, they argue that mean reversion can be explained by the CAPM if the market risk pre-
mium is allowed to vary over time. Note that this ﬂuctuation is in accordance with the theoretical
explanation of mean reversion in efﬁcient markets; expected returns ﬂuctuate in a mean-reverting
manner (Summers 1986). Gropp (2004) argues that valuation ratios are inherently ﬂawed, because
information on company fundamentals cannot be compared to stock prices due to the delay in
adjustment. Expected future dividends and earnings inﬂuence fundamental value, which cannot be
captured by the current dividend yield or price-earnings ratio. Moreover, the loss of information
due to the use of proxies may contribute to the failure to recognize mean-reverting behavior.
3 Mean reversion model
We consider the stock market indexes of N countries, observed over T years. Each stock index
is expected to revert to its intrinsic value in the long run. In line with Balvers et al. (2000), we
assume a mean-reverting process for each country i:
ri





tC1 equals the continuously compounded return on the stock index of country i between
time t and t C 1, pi
tC1 is the natural logarithm of the intrinsic value of the stock index of country
i at time t C 1 and pi
t is the natural logarithmic stock index of country i at time t. The error term
"i
t is assumed to be a country-speciﬁc stationary process with unconditional mean zero. Parameter
ai is a country-speciﬁc constant and i indicates the speed of reversion of the index price process
of country i. The relation between the index return and the deviation from its fundamental value
depends entirely on parameter i. The process in Equation (1) is a mean-reverting process if
0 < i < 1. Mean aversion occurs for i < 0.
To estimate the parameters ai and i directly, we have to know the fundamental value pi
t .
Unfortunately, due to the difﬁculty of determining ﬁrms’ intrinsic value, this value can generally
not be measured. Like Balvers et al. (2000), we assume that the difference in intrinsic value be-
tween the natural logarithm of the stock index (pb
t ) and the natural logarithm of the benchmark
index (pb
t ) is a stationary process.2 We assume the benchmark b to be deﬁned in such a way that
for all countries i the following holds:
pi
t   pb
t D ci C i
t; (2)
where ci is a country-speciﬁc constant and i
t is a zero-mean stationary process. The stationary
process i
t of Equation (2) may be serially correlated over time, as well as correlated across coun-
tries. Furthermore, we assume that the stock index benchmark follows the mean-reverting process
of Equation (1) and that the reversion speed parameter i is constant across all countries (i.e.
i D ). The latter assumption does not imply that the mean-reversion process is synchronized
across countries. Only the speed at which stock prices revert to their fundamental values is the
same (Balvers et al. 2000). With the mean reversion speed constant across countries, it is possible
to adopt a panel data approach. One advantage of such an approach is the large increase in sample
size and the substantial increase in the power to test the null hypothesis  D 0 (corresponding to
no mean reversion).
Consider the differences between the returns of country i and benchmark b at time t C 1:
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t consists of two zero-mean stationary processes, whose statistical
properties it inherits. In particular,  i
t is allowed to be correlated over time and across countries.
All variables in Equation (3) are observable from historical data, and therefore the country-speciﬁc
constants and the speed of reversion  can be estimated. To deal with serial correlation, k lagged
return differentials are added to the equation. Choosing the right value of k (using e.g. Bayesian






















Equation (4) boils down to a cointegration model, according to which the stock market index in
country i is cointegrated with the benchmark index for  6D 0. We can estimate the model in Equa-
tion (4) using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR); see e.g. Johnston & DiNardo (1997). How-
ever,theestimatedmodelcoefﬁcientsaregenerallybiasedandthebiasmaybesevere(Andrews & Chen
1994). Therefore, we proceed as in Andrews & Chen (1994) and use a bootstrap approach to ob-
tain an (approximately) mean-unbiased estimate of , the model coefﬁcient of interest, and a corre-
sponding 95% conﬁdence interval for the purpose of statistical inference. In contrast to the Monte
Carloapproachemployedby Balvers et al.(2000),wedonotimposenormalityonthemodelresid-
uals. As stock returns are generally found to be fat-tailed, we follow a non-parametric approach
and simply bootstrap from the empirical distribution of the model innovations. For more details
about our bootstrap approach we refer to Appendix A.
4 Data
Shortlyafterthesecondmillennium,Dimson et al.(2002)publishedabookontheﬁnancialhistory
of 17 countries with historically well-developed economies and ﬁnancial markets. The countries
included are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, South-Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United
8States.Theauthorscollectedannualequity,bondandtreasurybillinvestmentdatafromalloverthe
world over a long horizon. With the aid of many local specialists, they determined the most exact
index value possible for each of the 101 years from 1900 to 2000, adjusted for inconsistencies. In
addition, they constructed a world index from the values of the country indexes.3 Every year the
authors present an extension of the data, cumulating in an uninterrupted series of 109 yearly stock
market returns up to the year 2008. Table 1 gives the mean, the standard deviation, the skewness
and the kurtosis of the annualized continuously compounded nominal returns on the stock values
between 1900 and 2008 in US dollars. Also shown is the beta coefﬁcient with the world index.
The largest historical return over the full period is found for Sweden, followed closely by the
Australian market, with average yearly returns of 9:9% and 9:7%, respectively. The lowest average
for the full period is found for Italy, where a mean return of 5:1% was realized. The most volatile
markets are Germany and Japan. In the years that ended World War I (1918) and World War II
(1945), Germany suffered extreme declines in its market prices: 73% and 79%, respectively. In
each case, the stock market regained the losses a number of years later; during 1923 and 1948 the
German stock market skyrocketed by a striking 338% and 700%, respectively. The ﬂuctuations
during these historically critical years cause the standard deviations to rise substantially. Similar
ﬁndings apply for the Japanese equity market index. The lowest volatility is observed in Canada,
followed by Switzerland and the United States.
The skewness of most countries is negative, which indicates higher volatility in negative re-
turns. Especially Japan and France show relatively high volatility when stock markets decline. The
excess kurtosis measures the deviation of the kurtosis from three. In case the excess kurtosis equals
zero, the tails of the return distribution are comparable to those of a normal distribution. Where
the excess kurtosis is zero, the tails of the return distribution are comparable to those of a normal
distribution. Where the excess kurtosis much greater than zero, the return distribution exhibits fat
tails. The market index of the United States has the lowest kurtosis; its value of 3:7 indicates that
the tails of the return distribution are comparable to a normal distribution. The obvious outlier in
excess kurtosis is Japan with a kurtosis of 21:3. Germany follows with a kurtosis of 9:1.
The last column of Table 1 displays the beta coefﬁcient with respect to the world index. The
beta describes the relation between the returns on the country index and the returns on the world
9index. The lowest beta value is obtained for Spain (0.71) and the highest for Germany (1:13).
5 Empirical results
Before estimating the panel data model as introduced in Section 3, we compare each country’s
index returns individually to a benchmark. This approach allows us to estimate country-speciﬁc
values of the mean-reversion parameter i.
5.1 Individual countries
The ﬁrst column of Table 2 provides the country-speciﬁc estimates O i
0 based on SUR estima-
tion, with corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals obtained from the augmented Dickey-Fuller
test applied to Equation (4). The bootstrap approach (see Appendix A) has been used to obtain
median-unbiased estimates of O i (see Section 3), which are reported in the third column of Ta-
ble 2. The corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals are reported in the fourth column of Table 2.
The estimates in the ﬁrst column are all positive, but not signiﬁcantly different from zero (at the
5% signiﬁcance level). The biased estimates are substantially larger than the median-unbiased es-
timates based on the bootstrap method. The main result from Table 2 is that the median-unbiased
estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Hence, for no country do we ﬁnd evidence in
favor of mean reversion. A second important result emerging from Table 2 is that the speed of
mean reversion does not differ signiﬁcantly across countries.
Table2 providesestimates based onthe worldindexbenchmark. Bycontrast, Table3considers
four different benchmarks for the stock indexes: the indexes for the United States, Japan, France
and Germany. For one out of four benchmarks, signiﬁcant mean reversion is found for Belgium,
Denmark, Norway, Sweden and South-Africa. For all remaining countries the estimated speed of
mean reversion as reported in Table 3 is not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Moreover, the esti-
mates do not signiﬁcantly differ across the four different benchmark countries. These conclusions
underline that the choice of benchmark hardly affects the estimated speed of mean reversion.
105.2 Panel data approach
Despite our sample period of more than a century, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant evidence for mean
reversion at the country level. A serious problem with hypothesis testing in cointegration models
is the low power of these tests, particularly in relatively small samples. In our particular case we
may fail to reject the null hypothesis of no mean reversion simply because our tests lack statistical
power. To improve the signiﬁcance of our estimation results, we apply the panel data model de-
scribed in Section 3 to the data of Dimson et al. (2002). The panel data model is estimated under
the assumption that the speed of mean reversion is the same in all countries under consideration.
The lack of signiﬁcant differences in the speed of mean reversion across countries justiﬁes this
assumption. Again the bootstrap method is applied to obtain a mean-unbiased bootstrap estimate
of the speed of mean reversion.
Table 4 presents the estimates O 0 based on SUR estimation. Also the median-unbiased esti-
mates O  are included in the table, along with 95% conﬁdence intervals. In addition to the speed
of mean reversion, the half-life of the mean-reversion process is determined and reported (also
in combination with 95% conﬁdence intervals). This half-life is calculated as log0:5=log.1   /,
where  is taken to be the median-unbiased estimate.4
Again we examine the sensitivity of the results to the choice of benchmark. First consider
the world index as the benchmark. The biased speed of mean reversion O 0 over the full period
equals 0:0668. The median-unbiased estimate of the speed of reversion O  is 0:0491. To interpret
this number, consider the initial model of Equation (1), where stock returns are assumed to be a
function of the deviation from the intrinsic value. The positive value of O  implies that a positive
deviation between stock price and intrinsic value in this period will result in a negative expected
returninthenextperiod.Moreover,thevalueoflambdareﬂectsthespeedatwhichthepricereverts
to its fundamental value. Each year a price correction takes place of 4:9% of the logarithmic price
deviation from the fundamental value. In order to measure the speed of mean reversion in years,
the half-life of a gap between stock price and intrinsic value is considered. Notice that a higher
speed of reversion implies a shorter half-life. With the world index as benchmark, the half-life of
a price deviation is 13:8 years. In other words, 50% of a shock to the stock price will be offset in
13:8 years after occurrence. The 95% conﬁdence interval has a lower bound equal to 10:1 years
11and an upper bound of 21:1 years. The values corresponding to the four other benchmarks are
similar.
Balvers et al. (2000) establish signiﬁcant mean reversion during the period 1970 1996. Their
value of the unbiased estimate O  equals 0:182 (90% conﬁdence interval 0:110;0:250), which im-
plies a half-life of 3.5 years (90% conﬁdence interval 2:4;5:9 years). Their results with the U.S.
benchmark index are of a similar magnitude; the unbiased estimate of  equals 0.202, implying
a half-life of 3.1 years. Our unbiased estimates of the speed of mean reversion, based on a sam-
ple period of more than a century, differ substantially from the results established in Balvers et al.
(2000), based on less than three decades only. We document a much lower speed of mean reversion
and a much longer half-life. 5
6 Time-varying mean reversion
With our panel data model we establish a half-life of 13:8 years for the full sample period, cov-
ering the years 1900   2008. Several arguments plead against the assumption of a constant speed
of mean-reversion. For example, Kim et al. (1991) conclude that mean reversion is a pre-war phe-
nomenon only. Furthermore, Poterba & Summers (1988) conclude that the Great Depression had
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the speed of mean reversion. Also the difference in the speed of mean re-
version between our long sample period and the short interval considered by Balvers et al. (2000)
suggests changes in the speed of mean-reversion over time.
6.1 Rolling window approach
Our large panel data set allows us to analyze the speed of mean reversion during multiple smaller
time intervals. For this purpose, we apply a rolling window estimation approach to (overlapping)
time intervals of 27 years. The choice of the rolling window width is crucial. Too small a window
will result in very erratic results, but too large a window will yield too smooth results. Eyeballing
makes clear that a window width around 30 years works well. Eventually, we opt for a window
width of 27 years. The length of this interval is in accordance with Balvers et al. (2000), who
consider the years 1970   1996, facilitating comparison of our results to theirs.
12Table 5 displays the biased and unbiased estimates of reversion speed, based on 83 rolling
windows of 27 yearly returns. The corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals are provided as well,
based on the aforementioned bootstrap method. Clearly, the mean-reversion coefﬁcient  is not
constant over time. Its largest value is 0:284, observed during the period 1918 1944. The lowest
value is obtained for the interval 1901 1927 and equals 0:029, which is almost 10 times smaller.
The two intervals have a half-life of 2:1 and 23:6 years, respectively. An important issue is the
signiﬁcance of mean reversion. All periods without statistically signiﬁcant mean reversion include
one or more years before 1940.
To visualize the speed of mean reversion over time, Figure 1 displays the median-unbiased
rolling-window estimates of the speed of mean reversion, in combination with 95% conﬁdence
intervals. Figure 2 displays the corresponding half-life for the period 1900 2008, whereas Fig-
ure 3 shows the half-life and a corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval for the post-war period
1946 2008. Throughout, the rolling-window estimates are plotted against the mid-year of the
27-year rolling-window period. In Figure 1, a horizontal line is drawn at the critical value zero.
It is difﬁcult to attribute differences in the speed of mean reversion between two time intervals
to one speciﬁc year. Consider for example the last two intervals, 1981   2007 and 1982   2008.
The corresponding half-lives of the intervals are, respectively, 6:9 and 3:8 years. The decrease in
half-life by 3:1 years reﬂects the overall effect of adding an additional year to the rolling-window
interval and leaving one year out. Notice that the interval 1982 2008 takes into account the start
of the ﬁnancial crisis in the year 2008.
A more appealing interpretation can be found by studying Figure 1. Focusing on the periods
between 1924   1950 and 1939   1965, where no signiﬁcant mean reversion is observed, we
see that the years 1939   1950 are used for all rolling-window estimates during this period. This
suggests this period includes some years of extremely slow, if any, mean reversion. The only
major political event during these years is World War II. In the ﬁrst peak in Figure 1 there are
seven values remarkably larger than others. These points correspond to the seven rolling-window
periods between 1914 1940 and 1920 1946. All seven intervals include the period 1920 1940,
during which the Great Depression and the start of World War II took place. The second peak in
Figure 1 is observed for the periods between 1941 1967 and 1951 1977. The years 1951 1967
13are used for all rolling-window estimates during this period and correspond to an era with a lot of
tension related to the Cold War (such as the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the Cuba Crisis of 1962), as
well as the wars in Korea (1950 1953) and Vietnam (1959 1975). The third peak in Figure 1 is
less pronounced than the other two, but still clearly visible. It is observed for the periods between
1968   1994 and 1974   2000. The years 1974   1994 are used for all rolling-window estimates
duringthisperiod.TheEnergyCrisisof1979occurredduringthisperiod,aswellasBlackMonday
in 1987. Furthermore, the Oil Crisis of 1973 is used for all rolling-window estimates during this
period, except the last one.
Turning to Figure 2, we see that the differences in half-life between the periods before and
after mid-year 1953 are substantial. The post-1953 period exhibits signiﬁcant mean reversion with
relatively short half-lives, unlike the preceding period, where over 50% of the estimates of the
mean-reversion speed are insigniﬁcant, with relatively long half-lives. After mid-year 1953, the
average half-life is shorter and the variability of the estimates is much lower. All estimates before
mid-year 1953 include the 1926   1940 interval, whereas all post-1953 estimates incorporate the
years 1967   1982. The years 1926   1940 contain the Great Depression as the major economic
event, as well as the ﬁrst year of World War II. During the period 1967   1982 the major political
and economic events were more ample: the tension related to the Cold War, the Vietnam War
(1959   1975), the Oil Crisis (1973), and the Energy Crisis (1979).6
6.2 Economic explanation for time-varying mean reversion
Our results suggest that the speed at which stock prices revert to their fundamental value is higher
in periods of high economic uncertainty, caused by major events such as the Great Depression,
World War II, and the Cold War. We provide two explanations. In Section 2 we already mentioned
that mean reversion in stock prices may occur in efﬁcient markets. Assuming market efﬁciency,
the value of a stock is determined by the expected returns per share. Consequently, mean reversion
is observed when expected returns are mean reverting (Summers 1986). Deviations in expected
returns from their long-term value may be explained from uncertainty about the survival of the
economy, caused by e.g. a world war or a depression (Kim et al. 1991). Our ﬁndings suggest that
expected returns diverge away from their long-term value and converge back to this level relatively
14quickly during periods of high economic uncertainty; much faster than in more tranquil periods.
When the economic uncertainty dissolves, expected returns are likely to show a substantial in-
creaseinvalueduringarelativelyshorttimeperiod,whichcouldaccountforsuchhighmeanrever-
sion speed. Measures and interventions by ﬁnancial and government institutions to restore ﬁnan-
cialstabilitymayalsospeeduptheadjustmentprocess.Outsidetheframeworkofefﬁcientmarkets,
mean reversion may be caused by the irrational behavior of noise traders, resulting in stock prices
that take wide swings away from their fundamental value (Poterba & Summers 1988). Irrational
pricing behavior, in turn, can be caused by overreaction to ﬁnancial news (De Bondt & Thaler
1985, 1987). Our results could imply that noise traders overreact heavily to (ﬁnancial) news in
periods of high economic uncertainty. This may work in two directions. At the start of the un-
certainty, the overreaction to bad news may take stock prices far below their fundamental value.
During recovery, noise traders tend to overreact to the good news, resulting in stock prices far
above their fundamental value. In both cases, large price swings in relatively little time result in
rapid mean reversion.
Clearly, the nature of our analysis only permits us to suggest that the mean reversion speed
is higher in periods of high economic uncertainty. Similarly, our explanations are merely a ﬁrst
attempt to explain this phenomenon. We leave further analysis of this issue as an important topic
for future research.
7 Conclusions
This study analyzes mean reversion in international stock markets during the 1900   2008 pe-
riod, using annual data. Our panel of stock indexes in seventeen developed countries, covering a
timespan of more than a century, allows us to analyze in detail the dynamics of the mean-reversion
process. In the period 1900 2008 it takes stock prices about 13.8 years, on average, to absorb half
of a shock. However, using a rolling-window approach we ﬁnd large ﬂuctuations in the speed of
mean reversion over time. The highest speed of mean reversion is found for the period including
World War I, the Great Depression and the start of World War II. Also the early years of the Cold
WarandtheperiodcoveringtheOilCrisisof1973,theEnergyCrisisof1979andBlackMondayin
151987 are characterized by relatively rapid mean reversion. Overall, we document half-lives rang-
ing from 2.1 years to 23.8 years. In a substantial number of periods no signiﬁcant mean reversion
is found at all, which underlines the fact that the choice of data sample contributes substantially to
the evidence in favor mean reversion.
How can we explain time-varying mean-reversion in stock prices? Our results suggest that
the speed at which stocks revert to their fundamental value is higher in periods of high economic
uncertainty caused by major events such as the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold
War. In both efﬁcient and inefﬁcient markets, large price movements in relatively short time may
account for the a high mean reversion speed.
A time-varying speed of mean reversion has important economic implications. For example,
several studies show that excess returns can be earned by exploiting mean reversion of stock prices
(De Bondt & Thaler1985,1987,Jegadeesh & Titman1993,Campbell & Shiller2001,Balvers et al.
2000, Gropp 2004). However, such a trading strategy implies that a mean-reversion parameter has
to be chosen. Our results show that the estimated speed of mean-reversion depends crucially on
the sample period. In some time periods the mean-reversion parameter even turns out insigniﬁcant.
The low value of the mean reversion parameter, as well as its huge uncertainty, severely limits the
possibilities to exploit mean reversion in a trading strategy.
16Notes
1Mean aversion is movement of stock prices away from their mean value over time.
2This assumption cannot be tested empirically since both intrinsic values are unobservable. However, Balvers et al.
(2000) justify the assumption using an economic explanation based on the convergence of per capita GDP. Real per
capita GDP across 20 OECD countries display absolute convergence, which means that real per capital GDP converges
to the same steady state (Barro & Sala-i Martin 1995). According to the authors, absolute convergence results from the
fact that countries catch up in capital and technology. Developed countries are expected to catch up in capital because
lower per capita GDP implies a larger marginal efﬁciency of investment (Barro 1991). Catching up in technology
occurs because adapting an existing technology is cheaper than inventing a new one (Barro & Sala-i Martin 1995). The
connection between stock index convergence and GDP convergence is imposed by Balvers et al. (2000). Validity of
this argument can be found in a country index that represents the general state of the stock market. Assuming a direct
relation between the intrinsic value of the stock market and companies generating the gross domestic product justiﬁes
the assumption of stationarity between the country’s fundamental stock price indexes.
3The world index is a size-weighted portfolio of all country’s indexes. The weights before 1968 are based on GDP
due to a lack of reliable data on capitalization prior to that date. The weights from 1968 onwards are based on market
capitalizations published by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI). The sizes are annually adjusted to the GDP
or market capitalization at the beginning of the year. (Dimson et al. 2002, pg. 311)
4Consider a model of the form
pt D p
t C zt; (5)
where zt D zt 1 C t is a stationary AR(1) process. Error term t is assumed to be a zero-mean stationary process.
In this speciﬁcation, the permanent component p
t models the intrinsic value of the stock. Any shock to the permanent
component at time t is incorporated completely into the future stock price. Furthermore, the temporary component zt
models the mean-reverting part of the price. In such a model (where the temporary component has an autoregressive
structure), the half-life is deﬁned as log0:5=log . The mean-reverting process that we consider in this paper has the
form
pt D pt 1 C a C .p
t   pt 1/ C t: (6)
Such a model can be directly derived from Equation 5. Deﬁne  D .1   / and t D .1   /t C t and substituting
17the speciﬁc incremental value process p
t for p
t 1 C t, as follows:
pt D p
t C zt D p
t 1 C t C a C zt 1 C t
D p
t 1 C t C a C .1   /  .pt 1   p
t 1/ C t
D p
t C a C pt 1   .p
t   t/   .pt 1   .p
t   t// C t
D a C pt 1 C .p
t   pt 1/ C .1   /t C t D pt 1 C a C .p
t   pt 1/ C t:
Up to a constant, the price at time t equals the price at time t   1, adjusted for the deviation between the fundamental
price at time t and the stock price at time t   1. Notice that the mean process p
t is explicit in this model and that
mean reversion implies reversion towards the speciﬁc mean. The half-life of the stationary process in Equation (5) is
calculated by log0:5=log, with  D 1   , which leads to the formula to calculate the half-life in this section. Since
the half-life is a monotonic transformation of the mean reversion parameter , a median-unbiased estimator for the
half-life is simply obtained as log0:5=log.1   O / where O  is the median-unbiased estimator for . Similarly, the 97.5%
quantile for the half-life is obtained by taking the half-life transformation of the 2.5% quantile for the speed of mean
reversion. Notice that the the half-life is only deﬁned for  > 0; the half-life converges to inﬁnity for  # 0.
5Balvers et al. (2000) estimate the speed of reversion for the period 1970   1996 in a similar fashion as we do.
However, they use a Monte Carlo simulation to obtain median-unbiased estimators, assuming multivariate normality
of the residuals of the time series model in Equation (4). Moreover, their empirical analysis is based on the Morgan
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) for stock market price indexes of 18 countries. These countries are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Notice that in our data set, we have South-
Africa instead of Austria and Singapore, due to different choices made by the data collectors. For the period 1970 1996
as considered by Balvers et al. (2000), we establish a mean reversion speed equal to 0.218. This number is very close
to their speed of 0.182, conﬁrming that the small difference in countries does not substantially affect the results.
6Notice that the uncertainty around the last six rolling-window estimates of the half-lives in Figure 3 is very large.
This is due to the fact that the lower bounds for the corresponding median unbiased estimators are close to zero; the
upper bounds of the conﬁdence intervals for the half-lives are therefore very high.
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21Table 1: Summary statistics for the index returns during the period 1900   2008.
Standard Excess Beta with
Mean Deviation Skewness Kurtosis World Index
Australia 0.097 0.219 -0.879 2.408 0.903
Belgium 0.055 0.237 -0.074 1.278 0.945
Canada 0.085 0.185 -0.892 2.092 0.932
Denmark 0.081 0.210 -0.281 2.699 0.804
France 0.061 0.284 -1.034 4.337 1.052
Germany 0.061 0.433 0.429 6.076 1.134
Ireland 0.068 0.243 -0.740 4.208 0.959
Italy 0.051 0.302 -0.117 1.458 1.015
Japan 0.072 0.376 -3.018 18.29 0.876
The Netherlands 0.079 0.236 -0.952 4.654 0.889
Norway 0.069 0.275 -0.209 2.704 0.826
South-Africa 0.088 0.251 0.234 1.246 0.788
Spain 0.066 0.258 -0.229 1.005 0.710
Sweden 0.099 0.247 -0.697 1.161 1.008
Switzerland 0.078 0.187 0.066 1.016 0.753
UK 0.077 0.220 -0.568 2.675 1.027
US 0.088 0.196 -0.879 0.741 1.026
World 0.080 0.167 -0.915 1.949 1.000
22Table 2: Speed of mean reversion for individual countries (benchmark: World Index)
This table reports the country-speciﬁc estimates of the speed of mean reversion, based on the
World Index as benchmark. The sample period covers the years 1900 2008. The biased SUR
estimate of the speed of mean reversion is reported (‘i
0’), together with a 95% conﬁdence
interval (‘95% C.I.). Also the median-unbiased estimate (‘i’) is provided, in combination with a
corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval based on the bootstrap approach (‘95% C.I.).
O i
0 95% C.I. O i 95% C.I.
Australia 0.082 (-0.011, 0.175) 0.057 (-0.010, 0.136)
Belgium 0.038 (-0.016, 0.092) 0.014 (-0.009, 0.065)
Canada 0.069 (-0.021, 0.159) 0.041 (-0.020, 0.114)
Denmark 0.067 (-0.041, 0.175) 0.029 (-0.034, 0.112)
France 0.037 (-0.026, 0.100) 0.004 (-0.015, 0.074)
Germany 0.071 (-0.025, 0.167) 0.045 (-0.016, 0.114)
Ireland 0.066 (-0.024, 0.156) 0.036 (-0.015, 0.110)
Italy 0.029 (-0.034, 0.092) 0.003 (-0.014, 0.057)
Japan 0.046 (-0.041, 0.133) 0.014 (-0.034, 0.083)
The Netherlands 0.065 (-0.043, 0.173) 0.028 (-0.030, 0.111)
Norway 0.045 (-0.036, 0.126) 0.008 (-0.024, 0.075)
South-Africa 0.120 (-0.006, 0.246) 0.094 (-0.002, 0.187)
Spain 0.029 (-0.025, 0.083) 0.001 (-0.027, 0.054)
Sweden 0.095 (-0.013, 0.203) 0.068 (-0.008, 0.147)
Switzerland 0.117 (-0.009, 0.243) 0.095 (-0.002, 0.177)
UK 0.073 (-0.044, 0.190) 0.029 (-0.032, 0.123)
US 0.085 (-0.026, 0.196) 0.060 (-0.007, 0.137)
23Table 3: Speed of mean reversion for individual countries (different benchmarks)
This table reports country-speciﬁc estimates of the speed of mean reversion, based on different
benchmark indexes (US, Japan, France, and Germany). The sample period covers the years
1900 2008. The biased SUR estimate of the speed of mean reversion is given (‘i
0’), as well as
the median-unbiased estimate (‘i’) based on the bootstrap approach. Also a corresponding 95%
conﬁdence interval for O i is provided (‘95% C.I.).
O i
0 O i 95% C.I. O i
0 O i 95% C.I.
Benchmark: US Japan
Australia 0.130 0.094 (-0.014, 0.199) 0.044 0.012 (-0.022, 0.081)
Belgium 0.040 0.014 (-0.007, 0.069) 0.076 0.046 (-0.021, 0.127)
Canada 0.077 0.058 (-0.029, 0.137) 0.045 0.015 (-0.028, 0.076)
Denmark 0.064 0.028 (-0.026, 0.121) 0.063 0.023 (-0.036, 0.109)
France 0.040 0.007 (-0.014, 0.057) 0.083 0.045 (-0.030, 0.135)
Germany 0.072 0.036 (-0.012, 0.116) 0.081 0.049 (-0.025, 0.133)
Ireland 0.065 0.042 (-0.010, 0.117) 0.089 0.063 (-0.018, 0.142)
Italy 0.031 0.005 (-0.014, 0.053) 0.063 0.036 (-0.017, 0.103)
Japan 0.045 0.020 (-0.027, 0.087)
The Netherlands 0.072 0.046 (-0.029, 0.105) 0.052 0.006 (-0.045, 0.098)
Norway 0.044 0.006 (-0.022, 0.067) 0.071 0.034 (-0.031, 0.115)
South-Africa 0.137 0.109 (0.020, 0.199) 0.053 0.018 (-0.025, 0.098)
Spain 0.029 0.004 (-0.018, 0.049) 0.077 0.051 (-0.021, 0.117)
Sweden 0.126 0.094 (0.002, 0.189) 0.054 0.020 (-0.022, 0.090)
Switzerland 0.099 0.070 (-0.008, 0.155) 0.065 0.032 (-0.024, 0.107)
UK 0.078 0.045 (-0.014, 0.122) 0.068 0.038 (-0.031, 0.114)
US 0.045 0.012 (-0.030, 0.078)
Benchmark: France Germany
Australia 0.042 0.012 (-0.011, 0.077) 0.059 0.031 (-0.013, 0.098)
Belgium 0.205 0.169 (0.002, 0.193) 0.075 0.041 (-0.034, 0.125)
Canada 0.041 0.009 (-0.014, 0.077) 0.064 0.034 (-0.017, 0.106)
Denmark 0.068 0.033 (-0.022, 0.111) 0.077 0.050 (0.050, 0.124)
France 0.072 0.031 (-0.029, 0.118)
Germany 0.072 0.039 (-0.039, 0.125)
Ireland 0.077 0.040 (-0.030, 0.129) 0.091 0.062 (-0.021, 0.145)
Italy 0.081 0.036 (-0.041, 0.145) 0.059 0.024 (-0.043, 0.098)
Japan 0.083 0.039 (-0.032, 0.149) 0.081 0.049 (-0.025, 0.138)
The Netherlands 0.043 0.002 (-0.028, 0.081) 0.082 0.052 ( -0.024, 0.136)
Norway 0.179 0.145 (0.006, 0.195) 0.067 0.027 (-0.027, 0.117)
South Africa 0.045 0.011 (-0.015, 0.080) 0.063 0.030 (-0.021, 0.105)
Spain 0.136 0.105 (-0.014, 0.199) 0.071 0.039 (-0.026, 0.118)
Sweden 0.054 0.018 (-0.011, 0.088) 0.078 0.052 (-0.008, 0.121)
Switzerland 0.050 0.009 (-0.023, 0.088) 0.082 0.054 (-0.015, 0.135)
UK 0.047 0.001 (-0.027, 0.082) 0.087 0.055 (-0.019, 0.144)
US 0.040 0.008 (-0.014, 0.074) 0.072 0.042 (-0.014, 0.120)
24Table 4: Speed of mean reversion based on the panel data model
This table reports the estimated speed of mean reversion based on the panel data model for
different benchmark indexes. In the panel data model the speed of mean reversion is assumed to
be the same in all seventeen countries under consideration. The sample period spans the years
1900-2008. The biased SUR estimate of the speed of mean reversion is given (‘0’), as well as
the median-unbiased estimate (‘’) based on the bootstrap approach. Also a corresponding 95%
conﬁdence interval for O  is provided (‘95% C.I.). Finally, the corresponding half-life is reported,
with associated 95% conﬁdence interval.
Half-life
Benchmark O 0 O  95% C.I. in years (C.I.)
World 0.0668 0.0491 (0.0323, 0.0661) 13.8 (10.1, 21.1)
US 0.0699 0.0523 (0.0353, 0.0697) 12.9 (9.6, 19.3)
Japan 0.0714 0.0521 (0.0304, 0.0713) 13.0 (9.4, 22.5)
France 0.0708 0.0533 (0.0306, 0.0718) 12.7 (9.3, 22.3)
Germany 0.0728 0.0541 (0.0298, 0.0755) 12.5 (8.8, 22.9)
25Table 5: Rolling-window estimates of the speed of mean reversion 
This table reports rolling-window estimates of the speed of mean reversion, based on the panel data model.
The rolling-window interval is reported (‘Period’), as well as the biased SUR estimate of the speed of
mean reversion during that period (‘0’). Also the median-unbiased estimate is displayed (‘’) together
with a corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval, both based on the bootstrap approach (‘95% C.I.).
Period O 0 O  95% C.I. Period O 0 O  95% C.I.
1900 to 1926 0.081 0.030 (-0.029, 0.086) 1942 to 1968 0.178 0.151 (0.086, 0.196)
1901 to 1927 0.084 0.029 (-0.031, 0.088) 1943 to 1969 0.207 0.177 (0.115, 0.225)
1902 to 1928 0.085 0.031 (-0.030, 0.083) 1944 to 1970 0.242 0.213 (0.158, 0.260)
1903 to 1929 0.112 0.064 (-0.015, 0.117) 1945 to 1971 0.192 0.163 (0.093, 0.209)
1904 to 1930 0.124 0.078 (-0.001, 0.136) 1946 to 1972 0.174 0.145 (0.072, 0.188)
1905 to 1931 0.123 0.066 (-0.020, 0.132) 1947 to 1973 0.230 0.203 (0.152, 0.248)
1906 to 1932 0.124 0.066 (-0.020, 0.129) 1948 to 1974 0.276 0.251 (0.199, 0.301)
1907 to 1933 0.126 0.067 (-0.010, 0.130) 1949 to 1975 0.209 0.167 (0.094, 0.220)
1908 to 1934 0.141 0.086 (0.008, 0.152) 1950 to 1976 0.224 0.185 (0.118, 0.234)
1909 to 1935 0.139 0.081 (0.001, 0.151) 1951 to 1977 0.213 0.167 (0.089, 0.229)
1910 to 1936 0.135 0.082 (0.009, 0.149) 1952 to 1978 0.171 0.111 (0.033, 0.177)
1911 to 1937 0.150 0.094 (0.023, 0.163) 1953 to 1979 0.191 0.129 (0.048, 0.205)
1912 to 1938 0.148 0.096 (0.011, 0.165) 1954 to 1980 0.190 0.127 (0.060, 0.196)
1913 to 1939 0.171 0.120 (0.046, 0.191) 1955 to 1981 0.193 0.136 (0.071, 0.201)
1914 to 1940 0.237 0.191 (0.100, 0.265) 1956 to 1982 0.196 0.144 (0.075, 0.211)
1915 to 1941 0.237 0.185 (0.092, 0.265) 1957 to 1983 0.191 0.141 (0.067, 0.209)
1916 to 1942 0.252 0.213 (0.135, 0.280) 1958 to 1984 0.208 0.150 (0.074, 0.216)
1917 to 1943 0.284 0.258 (0.198, 0.308) 1959 to 1985 0.229 0.174 (0.100, 0.242)
1918 to 1944 0.315 0.284 (0.226, 0.341) 1960 to 1986 0.236 0.183 (0.109, 0.252)
1919 to 1945 0.284 0.228 (0.142, 0.304) 1961 to 1987 0.239 0.186 (0.109, 0.258)
1920 to 1946 0.244 0.178 (0.080, 0.271) 1962 to 1988 0.231 0.175 (0.101, 0.243)
1921 to 1947 0.169 0.096 (0.012, 0.187) 1963 to 1989 0.215 0.156 (0.067, 0.223)
1922 to 1948 0.159 0.073 (0.003, 0.166) 1964 to 1990 0.202 0.138 (0.065, 0.211)
1923 to 1949 0.166 0.092 (0.003, 0.186) 1965 to 1991 0.218 0.162 (0.089, 0.230)
1924 to 1950 0.158 0.080 (-0.002, 0.177) 1966 to 1992 0.227 0.177 (0.106, 0.236)
1925 to 1951 0.146 0.064 (-0.015, 0.153) 1967 to 1993 0.236 0.188 (0.115, 0.253)
1926 to 1952 0.162 0.078 (-0.011, 0.175) 1968 to 1994 0.245 0.201 (0.130, 0.259)
1927 to 1953 0.175 0.095 (-0.007, 0.186) 1969 to 1995 0.249 0.204 (0.133, 0.266)
1928 to 1954 0.174 0.096 (-0.007, 0.185) 1970 to 1996 0.260 0.218 (0.149, 0.281)
1929 to 1955 0.163 0.079 (-0.014, 0.170) 1971 to 1997 0.263 0.214 (0.138, 0.288)
1930 to 1956 0.153 0.075 (-0.009, 0.171) 1972 to 1998 0.252 0.195 (0.119, 0.273)
1931 to 1957 0.156 0.089 (-0.009, 0.171) 1973 to 1999 0.294 0.252 (0.181, 0.315)
1932 to 1958 0.150 0.086 (-0.008, 0.160) 1974 to 2000 0.276 0.233 (0.166, 0.295)
1933 to 1959 0.151 0.096 (-0.007, 0.171) 1975 to 2001 0.250 0.192 (0.113, 0.262)
1934 to 1960 0.141 0.076 (-0.011, 0.158) 1976 to 2002 0.256 0.197 (0.121, 0.272)
1935 to 1961 0.143 0.085 (-0.009, 0.153) 1977 to 2003 0.208 0.136 (0.052, 0.215)
1936 to 1962 0.133 0.056 (-0.031, 0.148) 1978 to 2004 0.188 0.121 (0.032, 0.199)
1937 to 1963 0.146 0.089 (-0.008, 0.165) 1979 to 2005 0.175 0.107 (0.018, 0.186)
1938 to 1964 0.155 0.093 (-0.004, 0.177) 1980 to 2006 0.154 0.103 (0.036, 0.173)
1939 to 1965 0.149 0.098 (-0.010, 0.165) 1981 to 2007 0.148 0.095 (0.018, 0.165)
1940 to 1966 0.148 0.108 (0.010, 0.165) 1982 to 2008 0.205 0.166 (0.100, 0.228)
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Appendix A Bootstrap Method
To test the null hypothesis H0 W  D 0, we estimate the remaining model parameters of Equa-
tion (4) under the null hypothesis and consider the small-sample distribution of O . Subsequently,
we use the bootstrap to obtain the empirical small-sample distribution of O . The bootstrap ap-
proach to estimate the empirical small-sample distribution of O  under the null hypothesis that
 D 0 consists of the following steps:
1. Estimate the empirical values of O  and O  under the null hypothesis that  D 0, i.e. estimate
the model in Equation (4), and store the residuals O !.
2. Use the residuals from Step 1 to generate the bootstrapped residuals O ! by randomly select-
ing T   k vectors. Each vector equals a row of error terms from N countries at some time
instance between t D 1 and T   k.
3. Recursively calculate the values of the return deviations using O ! in the model of Equa-
tion (4), under the assumption that  D 0, to arrive at a bootstrapped set of return deviations:
.ri
t   rb
t /, for t D 1;:::;T   k and i D 1;:::;N.
4. Apply a seemingly unrelated regression to the bootstrapped deviationsto ﬁnd a bootstrapped
estimate O .
5. Repeat Step 2 to 4 a large number of times, say B D 500, to ﬁnd the empirical small-sample
distribution of O  under the null hypothesis.
Thegoalofestimatingthecorrectedlambda’sandconﬁdenceboundsistwofold.First,toderivethe
median-unbiased half-life of the stock price deviations and the corresponding conﬁdence bounds.
Second, to compare the estimates over time to check the consistency of the speed of reversion
and its signiﬁcance over time. The procedure of determining the median-unbiased estimate is
similar to the procedure described above, however applied to different initial values for . The
goal is to specify the initial value  in such a way that the bootstrapped empirical small-sample
distribution has a median equal to the original estimate O  from the original data. To ﬁnd this
30initial value, a large range of initial speeds of reversion is considered. For each initial value 
the bootstrapped median is compared to the empirical estimate of . The initial values considered
are . 0:12; 0:10;:::;0:50/, and linear interpolation is used to ﬁnd the closest value for the
small-sample bias corrected estimate of . To ﬁnd the conﬁdence bounds, the same procedure is
executed, however applied to the 2:5 and 97:5 percentile.
31